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1. Introduction 
“We firmly believe that deterrence is perhaps the single most important ultimate outcome 
of the Division’s work [but] we have not attempted to value ... the deterrence effects of 
our successful enforcement efforts” (U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, 
Congressional Submission for Fiscal Year 2001).1 
 
Deterrence effects are essential for effective antitrust policy as authorities cannot 
vet all market behaviors for anti-competitive implications. Instead, antitrust authorities 
rely on firms internalizing certain rules and norms so that many anti-competitive actions 
are not taken in the first place (Joskow, 2002). While the deterrence effects of anti-cartel 
policy have received a good bit of scholarly attention (e.g., Feinberg, 1980; Block et al., 
1981; Block and Feinstein, 1986; Clarke and Evenett, 2003), the deterrence effects of 
merger policy have received less study. Morgan (2001: 459) observes that “Although the 
deterrent effects of merger control cannot easily be quantified, it is usually argued that 
they may be more important than the direct effects”. Accordingly, many economists (e.g., 
Nelson and Sun, 2001; Davies and Majumdar, 2002; Joskow, 2002; Crandall and 
Winston, 2003; Baker, 2003) have essentially been calling for more empirical work on 
merger policy deterrence effects. In this vein, Aaronson (1992) points out that merger 
policy deterrence manifests in two different forms: frequency-based and composition-
based deterrence. Composition-based deterrence involves merger proposals being shaped 
differently in order to avoid antitrust scrutiny (e.g., Stigler, 1966; Eckbo and Wier, 1985; 
Eckbo, 1992). Frequency-based deterrence involves merger plans being forsaken in order 
to avoid antitrust scrutiny (e.g., Seldeslachts et al., 2009). 
 The prevailing assumption throughout the small literature on merger policy 
deterrence effects is that frequency-based and composition-based deterrence go hand-
and-hand; i.e., if one is present then the other also manifests. For instance, a survey-based 
study by the Dutch antitrust authority (NMa, 2005) found the existence of Dutch merger 
policy to lead to 7.5 fewer (frequency effects) and 15 altered (composition effects) 
merger proposals per year. Behind the hand-and-hand conjecture is the assumption that 
                                                
1 See Nelson and Sun (2001) pages 939-940 for this exact quote and for additional claims by the FTC and 
DOJ regarding the pivotal importance of deterrence for effective merger policy. 
 3 
once certain types of anti-competitive mergers elicit antitrust scrutiny, then not all 
merging firms will be able to locate a suitable alternative merger. In other words, some 
firms will react to the foreclosure of certain merger activities by proposing different types 
of mergers, but others will simply react by ceasing merger activity altogether. 
Seldeslachts et al. (2009) cite these same rationales as suggesting that their cross-
jurisdictional study on frequency-based deterrence can also be interpreted as indicating 
composition-based deterrence.  
It is the prevailing notion that frequency-based and composition-based deterrence 
go hand-in-hand that we would like to question here. We show that merger policy 
changes may manifest in divergent deterrence effects: with composition effects going in 
one direction and frequency effects going in another direction. For instance, reducing 
antitrust scrutiny can lead to a higher frequency of merger proposals but also to relatively 
fewer anti-competitive proposals. Moreover, we find the number of merger notifications 
(frequency effects) to be a reliable measure of deterrence, while the relative anti-
competitiveness of merger proposals (composition effects) to be an unreliable measure. 
In short, our model generates ambiguous predictions with regard to the composition of 
future merger proposals; but, clear predictions with regard to future merger notifications. 
If merger notifications are a more appropriate indicator of underlying merger 
policy changes, then this has strong implications for the empirical analysis of deterrence 
effects. As Nelson and Sun (2001: 941) observe, a great need exists for empirical studies 
“that would allow one to estimate the deterrent effects of the agencies’ merger 
enforcement activities”. Accordingly, empiricists responding to the call – from Nelson 
and Sun, 2001; Davies and Majumdar, 2002; Joskow, 2002; Crandall and Winston, 2003; 
Baker, 2003 and others – to better estimate the deterrence role of merger policy 
enforcement should employ frequency-based measures as opposed to composition-based 
measures. In short, frequency-based effects are a more reliable indicator of underlining 
changes in the tenor of merger policy. 
The paper proceeds as follows in order to formally show the above claim. Section 
2 sets up and presents the basic model. Section 3 reports the main result by using the 
substitution of remedies for prohibitions as a relevant policy change. Section 4 concludes 
with some remarks and implications. 
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2. The model 
 
We consider a setting where firms decide on two issues: first, whether to propose 
a potential merger; second, what characteristics should proposed mergers entail. To 
model the second decision in a simple fashion, we adopt a procedure similar to Barros 
(2003) and Lyons and Medvedev (2007) by including all relevant merger characteristics 
in a single index . We use the convention that a higher  means a higher degree of 
restrictiveness: e.g., a low  can stand for a merger with asset divestitures to minimize 
market power concerns, while a high  can stand for a merger-to-monopoly. 
Accordingly, we define restrictiveness broadly: decisions over merger targets, geographic 
markets, contracts with suppliers and so on – are all subsumed in . Naturally, anti-
competitive effects positively depend on the proposed merger’s restrictiveness. For 
instance, a firm may acquire a direct competitor instead of a less-related target, thus 
increasing restrictiveness and thereby anti-competitive effects. 
Firms notifying a merger also face a decision by the antitrust authority – a 
decision that will fall into one of three possibilities: prohibition, remedy, or clearance. 
Moreover, firms obtain different profit streams according to whether the merger is 
approved as notified (clearance), approved subject to conditions (remedy), or rejected 
(prohibition). We denote merging firms’ profits under a clearance by , under a 
remedy by , and profits under a prohibition are normalized to zero. We further 
assume  > . Naturally, firms have a profit incentive to propose mergers with 
higher restrictiveness levels; accordingly, it is intuitive that  
.       (1) 
Additionally, firm gains occur at a decreasing rate: 
.       (2) 
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The antitrust authority must provide a market impact assessment for each merger; 
hence, some uncertainty exists for firms with respect to the ultimate antitrust decision. 
Davies and Majumdar (2002) observe that firms are unsure as to whether a proposed 
merger will be deemed too anti-competitive, since merger policy – unlike anti-cartel 
policy – exhibits uncertainty with respect to where the competitive/anti-competitive 
boundary lines are drawn. In short, merger policy exhibits too much complexity to 
generate ‘per se’ rules. To model this uncertainty, consider the antitrust decision as 
resulting from a comparison of the restrictiveness level implicit in the merger notification 
with the maximum restrictiveness level (denoted by ) the authority is willing to accept. 
Therefore, the antitrust authority’s judgment with respect to admissible restrictiveness 
levels is ex-ante unclear when firms decide on merger proposals. Firms’ uncertainty 
regarding  is described by a probability distribution  – denoting the 
probability that the antitrust authority’s critical threshold is smaller than the firm’s chosen 
.2 
Akin to D’Antoni and Galbiati (2007), the antitrust authority is better informed 
than the merging parties about the potential negative welfare implications of the merger. 
Accordingly, whenever  is below , the merger is cleared by the antitrust authority: an 
event occurring with probability . Furthermore, when  is above , two 
situations may occur: the merger elicits a prohibition or a remedy from the antitrust 
authority. The remedy option is taken when the proposed restrictiveness level is not 
particularly high: when  is above  but below . The parameter   – the remedy 
solution range – denotes the extra level of restrictiveness the authority is willing to accept 
as long as remedies are imposed. The prohibition option is taken when  is above . 
Hence,  also denotes the authority’s permissiveness in the sense that a larger  
eliminates the prohibition option.     
Assuming a cost K of setting a merger proposal, we can define the problem of 
choosing the restrictiveness level as:  
                                                
2 In terms of the model, the  function entering merging firms’ objective function is the result of a 
Bayesian updating process based on observing merger policy enforcement as well as (imperfect) 
knowledge regarding the  of proposed mergers. Indeed, Sah (1991) shows that if firms are Bayesian 
updaters, then a change in policy indicates a change in deterrence. 
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.  (3) 
Accordingly, the decision to propose a merger – the first decision noted above – is 
characterized by proposing a merger with restrictiveness  if , 
; but otherwise firms do not propose a merger. Furthermore, the 
optimal level of merger restrictiveness is given by the solution to 
 (4) 
The left-hand side of equation 4 shows the marginal cost (profit losses due to an 
intervention becoming more likely by the antitrust authority) while the right-hand side 
shows the marginal benefit (increase in expected profits) of increasing . 
 
 
3. Deterrence effects 
 
We can now address the impact of policy changes on deterrence by considering 
the substitution of remedies for prohibitions – a policy change which amounts to an 
increased  in our framework.3 The influential U.S. Federal Trade Commission (1999) 
study – which found divestitures to generally create viable competitors – legitimized the 
use of remedies and led to the FTC issuing guidelines for remedies in 1999, the EC 
following suit by issuing guidelines in 2001, and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) in 
2004 (Duso, Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2007). Accordingly, this policy shift led to remedies 
being increasingly employed in the cross-national context for merger policy. For instance, 
the European Commission has generally refrained from blocking mergers (Morgan and 
McGuire, 2004), and has instead increasingly relied on remedies to deal with anti-
competitive mergers (Morgan, 2001, 2002). See figure 1 where the average ratio of 
remedies to prohibitions for the US, UK, Germany, EU and Canada indicates some two 
                                                
3 For brevity, we will not investigate other policy changes (e.g., substituting clearances for remedies  or 
prohibitions for clearances), yet such changes could be addressed in a similar framework to exhibit merger 
notifications being a more reliable deterrence indicator, as briefly  shown in Seldeslachts et al. (2007). We 
restrict ourselves in this paper to the most relevant policy change in both the US and EU. 
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remedies for every prohibition in 1994, and a rising to around five remedies for every 
prohibition from 1999 to 2004. Accordingly, the trend toward remedies being applied 
where prohibitions were once applied has been manifest over the last fifteen years. Such a 
policy evolution likely induces a change in antitrust scrutiny levels since the penalty 
involved with remedies (elimination of some merger profits) is less than the penalty 
involved with prohibitions (elimination of all merger profits). Becker’s (1968) seminal 
contribution to the literature suggests then that the deterrence role of competition policy 
would erode due to remedies involving smaller penalties than prohibitions: with firms 
naturally attempting to pass more restrictive mergers through the antitrust review process. 
 
*** Insert Figure 1 around here *** 
 
We now consider the impact of the policy change on the two magnitudes of 
interest: frequency and composition of notified mergers. First, a straightforward 
comparative statics exercise establishes that 
 ,       (5) 
and it turns out that 
.     (6) 
The first term on the right-hand-side, , can be either positive or 
negative as it depends on the shape of  in the range of . With the second term 
being positive , the indeterminate first term results in an ambiguous total 
effect. The first term is actually zero for the uniform distribution; thus, moving toward a 
more lenient merger policy (substituting remedies for prohibitions) results in more 
restrictive mergers being proposed – the expected effect. Yet for a sufficiently negative 
, the reverse effect (i.e., fewer restrictive mergers being proposed) can 
result.4 This happens when increased restrictiveness induces, at the margin, a significant 
                                                
4 For example, if we take F to be a negative exponential density, the effect would be negative. But if F is a 
density with an increasing hazard rate (e.g., a normal distribution), then the effect would be positive. It is a priori 
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drop in the probability of a merger eliciting a remedy and a significant increase in the 
probability of eliciting a prohibition. We next explain this effect in more detail.  
The indeterminate sign of  owes to the change in  involving 
two different effects. First, by increasing , the authority applies remedies to some 
mergers that previously incurred prohibitions; thus, merging firms are more likely to 
obtain the remedies profit stream. Second, when the remedies profit stream is positively 
correlated with restrictiveness, the marginal benefit from a higher  increases. The 
importance of this extra higher- -induced incentive to increasing , however, depends 
on how often firms expect to be in this range; indeed, the number of cases to which this 
applies is likely to be smaller for a higher . Thus, when the marginal impact of 
restrictiveness on the remedies profit stream is small but increasing  significantly 
enhances the probability of incurring a prohibition, then merging firms may prefer to 
reduce restrictiveness in order to increase the probability of eliciting a remedy as opposed 
to a prohibition. 
Accordingly, our model generates ambiguous predictions with regard to the 
composition of future merger notifications. The equilibrium effect on composition-based 
deterrence is unclear, thus implying that replacing prohibitions with remedies could lead 
to less – not more – restrictiveness in future merger notifications. 
The predictions on the number of future merger notifications – frequency-based 
deterrence – suggest a less ambiguous effect. By direct application of the envelope 
theorem: 
.       (7) 
Increasing  thus leads to an increased expected value for proposing mergers. This 
dynamic owes to there being a lower probability of eliciting a ‘zero-payoff’ prohibition. 
The equilibrium effect on frequency-based deterrence is clear; thus, substituting remedies 
for prohibitions leads to an unambiguous increase in the number of merger notifications. 
Hence, the number of mergers represents a natural variable of interest when it comes to 
measuring deterrence effects. 
                                                                                                                                            
unclear as to which density would prevail. Thus, this is ultimately an empirical question that would probably be 
hard to measure. 
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4. Concluding remarks 
 
 We show that the empirical assessment of merger policy enforcement should be 
conducted by looking at the number – not the composition – of merger notifications. The 
frequency of mergers captures in a clean way how firms react to competition policy 
changes, and thus helps trace back the underlying policy change. The message that 
empiricists should employ frequency-based measures as opposed to composition-based 
measures of deterrence is highlighted by the fact that many economists have been calling 
for more empirical work on merger policy deterrence effects. Our main point then is 
simple but important, as it is imperative that empiricists look for deterrence in the right 
place.  
The propensity for merger policy toughness and composition-based deterrence to 
not always involve the expected positive relationship yields additional implications 
beyond the merits of employing frequency-based deterrence measures. If antitrust 
authorities are ultimately concerned about the composition of merger notifications (i.e., 
minimizing the number of anti-competitive merger proposals), then our analysis suggests 
that less – not more – vigorous merger policy may sometimes be the means to reduce 
anti-competitive merger proposals. For example, substituting remedies for prohibitions – 
and not prohibitions for remedies – might sometimes induce fewer anti-competitive 
merger notifications. More generally, our analysis indicates that tougher merger policy 
may not always generate the intended increase in composition-based deterrence.
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